WASHINGTON, Aug 7: A research paper prepared for US lawmakers backs academics and non-proliferation activists who warn that the July 18 nuclear deal between the US and India could jeopardize international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

“US-India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other non-nuclear-weapon states, like Pakistan,” warns the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

CRS reports on foreign policy issues are keenly read by US lawmakers and this report is particularly important because the proposed deal has to be approved by both houses of the US Congress before it becomes effective. Until 2004, China was not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which forbids cooperation with states that have not yet signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Russia, an NSG member, exported nuclear fuel, citing a safety exception, but NSG members opposed the move so strongly that Russia suspended supply in 2004.

There are indications that Russia may be reconsidering proposals to resume fuel exports, warns the CRS report. Experts believe that a deal allowing India to acquire nuclear technology from the US could prompt Russia to resume supplies as well.

A US State Department fact-sheet on the Nuclear Suppliers Groups notes that “the NSG was formed in 1974 following the Indian nuclear explosion which demonstrated how nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.”

“If implemented, (the Indo-US deal) would dramatically shift US non-proliferation policy and practice towards India. Such cooperation would also contravene the multilateral export control guidelines of the NSG, which was formed in response to India’s proliferation,” notes Sharon Squassoni, author of the CRS paper titled, “US Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress”.

“Some observers have maintained that while the strategic benefits of expanded cooperation with India may be considerable, the non-proliferation costs may outweigh the benefits,” she warns.

The report shows how the US-India nuclear cooperation raises several issues for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. “First and foremost is the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,” says the author, noting that in exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation, non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT gave up the option of developing nuclear weapons.

The report notes that the discovery of the A. Q. Khan network in 2004 prompted the United States, its allies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the G-8, and the NSG to seek to further tighten restrictions on sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

Although some NPT members believe that such restrictions contradict the basic bargain of the NPT, other NPT members argue that restricting technologies even further is necessary.

“Nonetheless, at a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and implementation and for tighter multilateral controls, US nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an exception to NSG full-scope safeguards requirements,” says Ms Squassoni.

She points out that the Bush administration has not revealed publicly how it will handle NSG guidelines, but consensus among the 44 NSG members is not always assured. “Some states may agree that it is time to create a new paradigm for India, while other states, particularly those who have benefited from the right of peaceful nuclear cooperation under the NPT, may not.”

The report argues that dissent within the NSG could be counterproductive to achieving other objectives the US is pursuing in nuclear non-proliferation, for example, restricting the fuel cycle, disarming North Korea, and restraining Iran, all of which rely on the considerable support of friends and allies.

US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told reporters on July 19, 2005, that the administration will put a specific programme in front of Congress when it returns from August recess “that would allow the US to proceed to commit itself to this programme of cooperation” with the advice and agreement of Congress.

Several questions could arise as Congress considers the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal, says the CRS report. These include:

— How complete are India’s declarations of civilian facilities? What is the level of intrusiveness of the IAEA’s programme to inspect those facilities?

— What is the added value of the additional protocol, given the likelihood that nuclear weapon facilities will not be able to be inspected? — How well is India’s export control implementation functioning?

— What are India’s plans for its nuclear weapons programme and what is the possibility that US assistance could benefit that weapons programme?

— If India is prepared to take on the responsibilities undertaken by other nuclear weapon states, is it prepared to stop producing fissile material for weapons? Is it prepared to declare some nuclear material as excess to its defence needs and place that material under IAEA safeguards? — What impact will nuclear safeguards on civilian facilities have on India’s transparency efforts with Pakistan?