BAGHDAD: One out of every four Americans wants US forces to withdraw from Iraq now, according to a Gallup poll. Some worry over the mounting rate of casualties. Others sense they were duped over the need for war. Some are traditional isolationists who want no American part in foreign affairs. Others oppose the Bush administration’s new imperialism with its doctrine of pre- emptive military strikes and its contempt for other nations’ opinions — the two vices which led to the attack on Iraq.

Whatever their motives, American calls for “US troops out” raise the same questions that rack the minds of Iraqis as they enter the fourth month of the occupation. What would happen if the Americans indeed pulled out abruptly? Would there be a security “vacuum” and who would fill it?

The return of Saddam Hussein and his regime — which US officials cite as a serious possibility — is one of the less likely scenarios. It would clearly be a massive propaganda blow to Bush and his neo-conservatives, dooming him to defeat in next year’s election. But the chances are remote. The old regime has been smashed for ever. A handful of its loyalists and security apparatchiks have gone underground and are part (but only one part) of the groups who are mounting armed attacks on US forces. Most former Baathists are busy trying to repair their lives, looking for safety from revenge-seekers, rewriting their CVs and breathing sighs of relief that the dictator who perverted the Baath party is out of power at last.

Iraq’s collapse into civil war on ethnic or religious lines is also improbable on present form. Some “ethnic cleansing” took place in and around Kirkuk and Mosul in the first post-war weeks as Kurds moved to reverse Saddam’s Arabization campaigns. US forces helped to stop it by imposing a freeze on all evictions until a property claims commission could adjudicate them. Would a US troop withdrawal prompt the evictions to resume again?

Not necessarily. Kurdish political leaders had no hesitation in joining the US-appointed “governing council” for Iraq and still have faith that they can draw up a new Iraqi constitution that would give them regional autonomy as well as a significant say in central politics. As long as they feel their dual demands can be met, they have a strong motive to press their constituents not to resort to ethnic violence. At the local level, Kirkuk and Mosul now have councils with Kurdish and Arab (as well as other minority) representation. This is also a strong factor in favour of stability.

The risk of Shia/Sunni violence is also low. Iraq’s modern history does not contain major cases of it. Saddam’s mass killing of Shia after their 1991 uprising was ordered from the top and performed by the security forces. It had little resonance among ordinary Sunnis, in contrast to the way that religiously or ethnically based hatreds have been aroused and manipulated by politicians in the Balkans, Ireland and South Asia.

Like their Kurdish counterparts, Shia leaders still give top priority to a new constitution that will outlaw discrimination on ethnic and religious lines for the first time. As Iraq’s majority community, they have an even greater stake in creating a federal state, and see no reason at this stage to contemplate armed action.

Of course, policies of violence cannot be totally discounted in a country traditionally awash with guns. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq can still call on the Badr brigade, the armed Shia guerrilla force which it built up during exile in Iran.

Muqtada al-Sadr, the fiery young fundamentalist from Najaf, is forming an “army” of devotees.

Their activities hint at what could be the main danger in a post-US Iraq — the threat of regional fragmentation and warlordism under the umbrella of a nominally unified state. Rather than sliding into civil war over who controls Baghdad, power in Iraq might slip into the hands of local religious leaders or Afghanistan-style warlords linked to, or tolerant of, mafia and other crime. Iraq’s tribal traditions proved remarkably resilient in the face of Saddam’s initial drive for secular modernisation. Later the dictator sought to encourage and coopt them. So the foundations for tribally based warlordism are still strong, as became clear in the aftermath of the old regime’s retreat in April when several tribal leaders sought to seize power in their own regions by force.

None of this means the US should claim the right to stay in Iraq. It does, however, point to the need to pull out carefully and responsibly. Precipitate and disorderly withdrawal is a sorry part of the legacy of colonialism in Palestine, India, Congo and elsewhere. This is why many Iraqis say they want the US to stay at least until it repairs the country’s infrastructure. They believe a sudden retreat, just to save the lives of guerrilla- threatened American troops, would be too easy a cop-out and another example of Washington’s failure to consult Iraqis. Having damaged their livelihoods through a decade of sanctions and three weeks of ferocious war, the US must clean up the mess before it leaves, they argue.

The key point is to give a clear calendar for the US and its British allies to go, preferably before the date of independence, but certainly no later. This would reassure Iraqis that the restoration of their sovereignty is imminent and guaranteed. By the same token, the US must abandon its efforts to pre-empt strategic decisions, sign leases on the long-term use of military bases, or award contracts in the oil sector or in privatizing the economy before an independent Iraqi government is in place.

In the interim it should heed the call from many Iraqis for foreign troops to pull out of the cities and give way to a reformed police force. This would remove the visibility of the occupation, reduce the danger of trigger-happy patrolling and significantly cut the number of attacks, most of which seem to be prompted by people who want to avenge the deaths of relatives at the hands of US troops or feel humiliated by foreign soldiers.

It is not too late for the UN to be given overall control over the transition to independence, as France, India, Russia and others have suggested. This would make it possible for UN peacekeepers to come in. The notion of US and British troops remaining in Iraq after an independent Iraqi government takes power in elections next year is absurd. A government that hosts invaders cannot be independent. But a government can retain UN- authorised peacekeepers for a period of several years without forfeiting its sovereignty, as for example Cyprus has done. If Iraqis want protection from potential instability when the US departs, the UN is the place to turn.—Dawn/The Guardian News Service.