While the first phase of the operation against what was supposed to be a redoubtable enemy in South Waziristan is apparently almost over, equally daunting tasks lie ahead. The tactics adopted by the army high command have beaten the Taliban on their own ground — descend from the ridges, command the heights and do not advance via roads. Four months of planning, with close coordination between the army and the air arm, has paid off, with many Taliban strongholds taken. The arms the militants left behind betray a flight in panic rather than a tactical withdrawal.

Nevertheless, it is an enemy that has been subdued, not vanquished. Before operation Rah-i-Najat was launched, the army put the Taliban strength at about 10,000. Since the maximum number of Taliban fatalities has been put at about 500, those not taken prisoner may have slipped into North Waziristan or the adjoining settled districts. They must be pursued relentlessly without being given a chance to reorganise, and the nation ought to be told what strategy the authorities have up their sleeve to finish the job.

Civil administration must now move into South Waziristan to prepare the groundwork for an eventual return to normal life. The agency has been virtually depopulated, and tribesmen wanting to return home will hesitate to do so because of the fear of a Taliban re-entry and backlash. It is thus the army’s responsibility to give the people a sense of security and establish a long-term presence in South Waziristan.

The military has done well to rehabilitate its image with victories over the Taliban in Swat and initial success of the ongoing operation. The army has all but recovered from the body blow suffered during the Musharraf era. It is now incumbent on politicians to provide high profile leadership that is in sync with the harsh reality of war. If they fail to do so, and the military continues to look good in comparison, the civil leadership will only undermine itself.